StegBlocks: ensuring perfect undetectability of network steganography by Fraczek, Wojciech & Szczypiorski, Krzysztof
  
 
StegBlocks: ensuring perfect undetectability of network steganography  
Wojciech Frączek, Krzysztof Szczypiorski 
Institute of Telecommunications 
Warsaw University of Technology 
Warsaw, Poland 
e-mail: wfraczek@gmail.com, ksz@tele.pw.edu.pl 
 
 
Abstract — The paper presents StegBlocks, which 
defines a new concept for performing undetectable 
hidden communication. StegBlocks is a general 
approach for constructing methods of network 
steganography. In StegBlocks, one has to determine 
objects with defined properties which will be used to 
transfer hidden messages. The objects are dependent on 
a specific network protocol (or application) used as a 
carrier for a given network steganography method. 
Moreover, the paper presents the approach to perfect 
undetectability of network steganography, which was 
developed based on the rules of undetectability for 
general steganography. The approach to undetectability 
of network steganography was used to show the 
possibility of developing perfectly undetectable network 
steganography methods using the StegBlocks concept. 
Keywords: information hiding, network steganography 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Network steganography incorporates all information 
hiding techniques that may be used to exchange secret data 
in telecommunication networks. This term was originally 
introduced by Szczypiorski in 2003 [1]. In network 
steganography, hidden communication is facilitated by 
methods which utilise network protocols or relationships 
between them as a carrier [2]. It is important to note that an 
observer (a third party) who is not aware that they are using 
the steganographic method is also not aware of the exchange 
of hidden data. 
Network steganography communication can be 
characterised by four features: bandwidth, undetectability, 
robustness, and cost. The first three features, introduced by 
Fridrich in 1998 [3], are often presented as vertices of a 
triangle in order to show the interdependence among them. 
For example, the higher the required bandwidth is, the more 
difficult it is to achieve high undetectability and robustness. 
This interdependence causes the need for a trade-off between 
the three features when a new steganographic system is 
designed. 
The last feature mentioned – cost – indicates the 
degradation of the carrier caused by the insertion of the 
secret data procedure [4]. It is important to note that the cost 
depends on each particular carrier and could be expressed in 
many ways, e.g. in-creased delay of packets, increased bit 
error rate, etc. 
It should be emphasised that the most desirable 
characteristic of network steganography communication is 
usually undetectability [5]. 
There are many known network steganography methods. 
However, most of them can be easily detected if the 
algorithm of the method is known to the third party ob-
server. Despite this fact, many authors of steganographic 
methods claim that the large number of possible ways of 
inserting hidden data into network communication makes 
detection of their methods extremely hard. The main focus of 
the analysis of undetectability of network steganographic 
methods is to show that the steganographic cost is very low. 
There are very few examples of the analysis of 
undetectability based on information theory or computation 
power, making it very difficult to assess the negative impact 
network steganography may have on our lives. 
To address the above-mentioned problem, in this paper 
we propose the StegBlocks concept, which was designed to 
enable undetectable network steganography communication. 
StegBlocks is not a method based on a single network 
protocol. It defines an algorithm of secret communication 
and requirements for a network protocol (carrier) which 
could be used to create the steganographic method. 
StegBlocks is used in this paper to show the possibility of 
constructing a network steganography method that is 
perfectly undetectable. The perfect undetectability is based 
on the information-theoretic approach, which has been 
described for general steganography in several publications 
[6-8]. We adjusted this approach to cover specific features of 
network steganography. 
In this article we focused on perfect undetectability, 
which is parallel to the perfect security of cryptographic 
ciphers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
introduces the concept of StegBlocks together with examples 
of methods built based on it. Section 3 describes the 
approach to the perfect undetectability of network 
steganography communication. Section 4 presents the proof 
of the possibility of creating a perfectly undetectable method 
based on StegBlocks. Finally, Section 5 concludes our work. 
  
 
II. STEGBLOCKS 
A. An idea 
StegBlocks works using carriers (network protocols), for 
which elements (called objects) with various identifiers can 
be defined and the number of possible identifiers is limited. 
Once the objects are defined, the steganographic method 
created using StegBlocks works in the following way: 
1. Among ݊  defined objects (objects with ݊  different 
identifiers), choose ݇ to be used as the steganographic 
key. The identifiers of the chosen objects have to be 
known to both the sender and the receiver of the hidden 
data. 
2. Objects are merged into sequences (called blocks). A 
block is defined as a minimal-length subsequence in 
which there is at least one of each ݇ steganographic key 
object. The beginning of a block has to be defined, e.g. 
the end of one block determines the beginning of the 
next block. 
3. Each block has an assigned value, which is the last ݔ 
bits of the number of objects in this block. The number 
of objects in the block includes all objects, not only 
objects which belong to the steganographic key. 
4. The values of the blocks indicate bits of the hidden 
message. If the value of the block which is to be 
transmitted is not equal to the bits of the hidden 
message, then the sender has to change the value of the 
block. 
 
The example of StegBlocks for four objects {1, 2, 3, 4}, 
from which 1 and 3 constitute steganographic keys, is 
presented in Fig. 1. The sender sends objects which form 
blocks based on the steganographic key. The first block 
consists of three objects {1, 4, 3}, because it is the minimal-
length sequence of an object, which contains all of the 
objects of the steganographic key starting from the 
beginning of the transmission. The subsequent blocks are 
determined in the same way. Additionally, in the 
communication presented in Fig. 1 it was assumed that the 
last 1 bit of the number of objects in a block specifies the 
value of the block. This means that the value of the first 
block is 1 (the block consists of 3 (112) objects), the value of 
the second block is 0 (the block consists of 6 (1102) 
objects), etc. The values of the blocks indicate the value of 
the hidden message, so in the presented example the hidden 
bits 1010 are transmitted. The receiver has to know the 
steganographic key in order to extract the secret message. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Example of StegBlocks 
 
The key element of StegBlocks is changing the values of 
the blocks in order to match them with the bits of the hidden 
message. This change can be made in three ways: 
• control of the current object, 
• control of the buffer, 
• control of the entire communication. 
 
Control of the current object is the approach in which, 
before sending the next objects, it is checked whether an 
object will complete the block. If the next object completes 
the block with a value which does not match the bits of the 
secret message, the sender suspends the sending of this 
object. Then the sender waits for next objects and the 
suspended object is sent when it is possible to complete the 
block with the required value. It could happen that the 
sender will have to suspend more than one object. 
Control of the buffer is the approach in which all objects 
are placed in a buffer of size s (s is the number of objects, 
ݏ ൒ 2) before sending. In comparison with the control of the 
current object, in this case the sender knows s subsequent 
objects which are to be sent, allowing for more possibilities 
of changing the order of the objects. 
Control of the entire communication is the approach in 
which the sender has access to all objects before the start of 
the communication. This approach allows for both the 
orders of any objects and the objects that are to be sent to be 
changed. In particular, it is possible to generate many 
possible sequences of objects to be sent in an overt channel 
and choose one, whose objects form blocks with values 
equal to bits of the secret message. 
 
B. Examples of network steganography methods created 
based on StegBlocks 
This section presents two examples of network 
steganography methods based on StegBlocks. One of the 
methods uses TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and the 
other method uses SCTP (Stream Control Transmission 
Protocol). 
 
1) StegBlocks TCP 
The StegBlocks TCP method uses parallel TCP 
connections between two chosen hosts. The objects of this 
method are TCP segments transmitted within the parallel 
connection, and the identifiers of objects are the identifiers 
of the connection. The identifiers of connection (1, 2, ...) are 
assigned starting from the connection that was established 
first. A connection that was established earlier has a lower 
identifier than a connection established later. TCP segments 
within a given connection are objects with the same 
identifier. StegBlocks TCP works in the following way: 
1. Two hosts, which are the sender and the receiver of the 
hidden data, have ݊  TCP connections established 
between them. Segments sent within a chosen 
connection are StegBlocks TCP objects with the same 
  
 
identifier. The number of unique identifiers of objects is 
equal to the number of used TCP connections. 
2. Before the start of steganographic communication, the 
steganographic key is chosen (݇ objects (TCP segments) 
with unique identifiers (TCP connections identifiers), 
which will determine the blocks). 
3. A block is defined as the minimal-length sequence of an 
object, which contains at least one segment from each of 
the ݇  chosen in the previous point TCP connections. 
There are two ways of determining the start and end of 
the block. In the first one, the start of the block is 
determined by the end of the previous block. In the 
second one, the start of the block is determined by 
sending a specified number of segments from the start of 
the previous block. In both cases it could be assumed 
that the start of the first block is the start of the 
transmission. 
4. The value of each block is the last ݔ bits of the number 
of TCP segments in this block. The number of segments 
in a block refers to all the segments in a block and not 
only segments within the chosen ݇  connections which 
determine the blocks. 
5. The value of a chosen block determines the bits of the 
hidden message. If the value of a block is not equal to 
the bits of the hidden message, the sender has to 
appropriately modify the value of the block by changing 
the order of the segments, which are sent within parallel 
TCP connections. 
 
The main problem with the presented method is the 
robustness of steganographic data transmission. Extracting 
the hidden message depends on the order of the reception of 
TCP segments. If one of the segments is significantly 
delayed or lost, it could influence the correctness of a 
received secret message. In order to avoid this issue, the 
sender has to wait to send the next segment of a message 
until they have received an acknowledgement of the 
reception of the previous segment. However, this solution 
may negatively affect the delays of an overt communication. 
 
2) StegBlocks SCTP 
The StegBlocks SCTP method works similarly to 
StegBlocks TCP, but in this case the problem of robustness 
is eliminated. 
The StegBlocks SCTP method uses one SCTP 
connection with multiple streams. The objects of this 
method are chunks with data (DATA chunks) of the SCTP 
proto-col sent within established streams. The identifiers of 
objects are identifiers of the streams. Other aspects of the 
StegBlocks SCTP method are analogous to the Steg-Blocks 
TCP method. 
The main advantage of the StegBlocks SCTP compared 
with StegBlocks TCP is the possibility of ensuring the 
robustness of the steganographic data transmission. In the 
case of StegBlocks SCTP, the receiver can determine the 
order of objects based on the TSN (Transmission Sequence 
Number) field, and not based on the time of the reception of 
specific objects (as in the case of StegBlocks TCP). The 
TSN is the sequence number for the DATA chunks, which 
is incremented and assigned to each chunk independently of 
the stream within which the chunk was sent. In the case of 
the delay or loss of a chunk, it can be retransmitted with the 
same TSN, which allows the correct reception of a secret 
message to be independent of the reception time of each 
object of the StegBlocks SCTP method. 
 
III. PERFECT UNDETECTABILITY OF NETWORK 
STEGANOGRAPHY 
Perfect undetectability means that an adversary with 
unlimited computational power is not able to state if in a 
given overt communication there is also a hidden message 
transmitted. There are three popular definitions of perfect 
undetectability (based on information theory), which were 
introduced mainly for general steganography. All three 
definitions are derived from Shannon’s definitions of the 
perfect security of a cryptographic system. 
In 1998 Zöllner et al. presented a definition [6] in which 
steganography is undetectable if a hidden message is 
independent from a carrier and a steganogram (a carrier with 
a hidden message). The authors showed that a 
steganographic system is undetectable if the adversary is not 
able to compare a carrier and a steganogram. In order to 
achieve it, the adversary cannot know what a carrier without 
a hidden message looks like. 
Cachin also proposed a definition of undetectable 
steganography in 1998 based on relative entropy (Kullback–
Leibler divergence) [7]. According to this approach the 
steganographic system is undetectable if the relative entropy 
of the distribution of carriers without hidden data and the 
distribution of carriers with hidden data is equal to 0. 
In 1999 Mittelholzer proposed a common definition of 
the security of steganography and watermarks [8]. According 
to this definition, a steganographic system is undetectable if 
it is not possible to distinguish a carrier and a carrier with 
hidden data. In order to measure this, the author suggested 
using an appropriate distortion measure, e.g. squared error 
distortion. 
Among the presented known definitions of perfect 
undetectability of steganography, the most comprehensive 
one is the definition suggested by Cachin (Def. 1) [7]. The 
definitions proposed by Zöllner et al. [6] and Mittelholzer [8] 
contain necessary conditions, but are not sufficient for 
undetectable steganography [7]. 
 
Def. 1. (Perfect undetectability of a steganographic method 
according to [7]) A steganographic method is perfectly 
undetectable if: 
 
  (1) 
 
ܦሺ ܲܥ||ܲܵ ሻ = ∑ ܲܥሺ݅ሻ log ܲܥሺ݅ሻܲܵ ሺ݅ሻ݅ = 0, 
  
 
where: 
஼ܲ  is the distribution of carriers without hidden data; 
ௌܲ is the distribution of carriers with hidden data; 
ܦሺ ஼ܲ|| ௌܲሻ is the relative entropy of the distributions ஼ܲ  and 
ௌܲ. 
 
Additionally, the author in [7] suggests assuming that the 
adversary knows the hidden message that could be sent using 
steganography. Consequently, an insertion algorithm cannot 
depend on the distribution of the hidden message. 
The presented definition is appropriate for steganography 
in the content, e.g. images. However in the case of network 
steganography it is suggested that three elements of network 
steganography communication be included in this definition: 
• data units (e.g. packets, segments); 
• transmission (time between sending/receiving data 
units); 
• hidden message. 
 
The mentioned elements were incorporated in the 
definition of the perfect undetectability of network 
steganography (Def. 2), which is based on Def. 1. 
 
Def. 2. (Perfect undetectability of a network steganography 
method) A network steganography method is perfectly 
undetectable if all the following conditions are satisfied: 
1. The conditional entropy of the steganogram and hidden 
message is equal to the entropy of the steganogram 
൫ܪሺܵ|ܯሻ = ܪሺܵሻ൯. 
2. The relative entropy of the distribution of data units of a 
carrier without hidden data ( ஼ܲ) and the distribution of a 
carrier with hidden data (PS) is equal to 0 ሺܦሺ ஼ܲ|| ௌܲሻ =
0ሻ. 
3. The relative entropy of the distribution of times between 
sending/receiving data units for a carrier without hidden 
data (PCt) and the distribution of times between 
sending/receiving data units for a carrier with hidden 
data (PSt) is equal to 0 ൫ܦ൫ ஼ܲ೟  || ௌܲ೟ ൯ = 0൯. 
The presented definition of the perfect undetectability of 
a network steganography method will be used to prove that a 
steganographic method based on StegBlocks can be perfectly 
undetectable. 
IV. PERFECT UNDETECTABILITY OF STEGBLOCKS 
StegBlocks helps in the creation of perfectly undetectable 
network steganography methods. In order to achieve this, it 
is necessary to impose additional requirements for the 
method based on StegBlocks. The key requirement is use of 
the Vernam cipher to encrypt a hidden message before 
inserting it into a carrier. 
 
Theorem 1. StegBlocks with the encryption of a hidden 
message using the Vernam cipher and the control of the 
entire communication allows for the creation of a network 
steganography method that is perfectly undetectable 
according to Def. 2. 
 
Proof of Theorem 1 
The proof uses a network steganography method based 
on StegBlocks with the following assumptions: 
• ݊  unique identifiers of objects belonging to the set 
ሼ1,2,3, … ݊ሽ are used; 
• Objects are sent in groups and each group has n objects 
with all possible values of identifiers; 
• Groups of objects are independent and the probability of 
the occurrence of each group of objects is the same 
(1/݊!); 
• The start of a StegBlocks block is the first object sent 
within a given group; 
• The last bit of the number of objects in the block is used 
as the value of the block; 
• The probability of occurrence of a block with value 1 or 
0 is equal to 1/2 (it is possible to achieve by appropriate 
choice of parameters ݊  and ݇  StegBlocks, e.g. n even 
and ݇ equal to 1); 
• A change of the value of a block can be made by 
changing the order of single objects or changing the 
order of groups of objects (and thereby blocks of 
StegBlocks); 
• A hidden message is encrypted using a one-time pad 
(the Vernam cipher) before inserting the message into a 
carrier. 
 
Data units for the method with the presented assumptions 
are groups of ݊ objects. 
The proof was divided into three parts corresponding to 
three conditions required to achieve perfect undetectability 
according to Def. 2: 
• Knowledge of bits of the hidden message (condition 1: 
ܪሺܵ|ܯሻ = ܪሺܵሻ); 
• Distribution of data units (condition 2: ܦሺ ஼ܲ|| ௌܲሻ = 0); 
• Distribution of times between sending/receiving data 
units (condition 3: ൫ ஼ܲ೟  || ௌܲ೟൯ = 0). 
The theorem was proved by showing that all three 
conditions required for perfect undetectability of a network 
steganography method (according to Def. 2) are satisfied for 
the method based on StegBlocks with the above-mentioned 
assumptions. 
 
1) Knowledge of bits of hidden message 
 
In order to show that knowledge of bits of a hidden 
message does not allow for determining if a network 
steganography method based on StegBlocks is used, it is 
necessary to check the value of the conditional entropy of a 
steganogram and a hidden message. If the conditional 
entropy of a steganogram and a hidden message is equal to 
the entropy of a steganogram, then the knowledge of a 
  
 
hidden message does not allow for any information on the 
steganogram to be gained. This means that knowledge of a 
hidden message does not help in determining if network 
steganography has been used. 
The condition ܪሺܵ|ܯሻ = ܪሺܵሻ is equivalent to condition 
ܲݎሺܵ = ݏ|ܯ = ݉ሻ = ܲݎሺܵ = ݏሻ for each ݏ א ܵ and ݉ א ܯ 
(s is a steganogram and ݉ is a hidden message). According 
to the assumptions regarding the considered network 
steganography method the probability of block of value 1 or 
0 is equal to 1/2. Let ݈ be the length of the key of a one-time 
pad, and therefore at the same time the length of a secret 
message and a ciphertext. After using an the one-time pad 
ܵ = ܯ۩ܭ, this becomes: 
 
ܲݎሺܵ = ݏ|ܯ = ݉ሻ = ܲݎሺܯ۩ܭ = ݏ|ܯ = ݉ሻ 
= ܲݎሺ݉۩ܭ = ݏሻ 
= ܲݎሺܭ = ݉۩ݏሻ 
= 12௟  = ܲݎሺܵ = ݏሻ.                           (2) 
 
2) Distribution of data units 
 
Each data unit of the considered network steganography 
method (group of ݊  objects) is a permutation of the 
ሼ1,2,3, … ݊ሽ  set. According to the assumptions of the 
method, groups of objects are independent and the 
probability of the occurrence of each group is the same  
( 1/݊! ). Let ሼ݁଴, ݁ଵ, ݁ଶ, … ݁௡!ሽ  be a set of all possible 
permutations of the ሼ1,2,3, … ݊ሽ  set and let the values of 
blocks determined by the groups ݁௜, where ݅ is odd, be equal 
to 1, and the values of other blocks be 0. In addition, let 
ܺ = ݔଵ, ݔଶ, … , ݔ௪  be a hidden message encrypted with the 
Vernam cipher. Then, assuring that values of blocks are 
equal to bits of encrypted hidden message can be achieved 
through the choice of subsequent groups of objects in the 
following way: 
 
                             ݏ௝ = ݁ቀ௜ௗೕା൫௫ೕْ௩ೕ൯ቁ ௠௢ௗ ௡!                        (3) 
where: 
݅ ௝݀ is an identifier of the j-th group of objects, which would 
be sent if steganography were not used; 
ݒ௝  is a value of a block determined by the j-th group of 
objects, which would be sent if steganography were not 
used; 
ݏ௝ is the j-th element of the steganogram (group of objects). 
 
Due to the fact that ݔ௝ are the subsequent bits of a hidden 
message encrypted with the Vernam cipher, the applied way 
of assuring that values of blocks are equal to bits of an 
encrypted hidden message is not changing the probability 
distribution of data units, so the relationship ܦሺ ேܲ|| ௌܲሻ = 0 
is true. 
 
3) Distribution of times between sending/receiving data 
units 
 
Two factors influence the times between 
sending/receiving data units in the case of using a network 
steganography method based on StegBlocks: 
• delays caused by inserting secret message into a carrier, 
• ensuring error-free steganographic communication in 
the case of additional delays and losses during 
transmission. 
 
It is possible to eliminate the delays caused by inserting a 
secret message into a carrier by using the control of the 
entire communication as a way of changing values of blocks 
of StegBlocks. The determination of objects to be sent before 
the transmission actually starts prevents potential additional 
delays during connection if the order of the objects needs to 
be changed. 
Delays and losses during transmission may influence the 
method of changing the order of objects based on 
StegBlocks, which could lead to the incorrect extraction of 
the hidden message by the receiver. In the case of the 
StegBlocks SCTP method this is not an issue, as the order of 
the objects is determined based on the TSN, not the actual 
time of their reception. Therefore, there is no need for an 
additional mechanism preventing the incorrect reception of 
steganographic data and there is no influence on the times 
between sending/receiving data units (ܦ൫ ேܲ೟ || ௌܲ೟൯ = 0). 
Ensuring the absolute undetectability of the StegBlocks 
TCP method requires an acceptance of potential errors in the 
steganographic transmission. If there are no additional 
actions related to ensuring error-free steganographic 
communication (e.g. waiting to send the next segment until 
acknowledgement of the reception of the previous segment 
has been received, as mentioned in Section 2), the 
distribution of the times between sending/receiving data 
units will not differ from the distribution for transmission 
without steganography (ܦ൫ ேܲ೟ || ௌܲ೟൯ = 0). 
Summing up, StegBlocks allows for the creation of a 
network steganography method for which the relative 
entropy of the distribution of times between 
sending/receiving data units for a carrier without a hidden 
message and the distribution of times between 
sending/receiving data units for a carrier with a hidden 
message is equal to 0. 
The proofs of the satisfaction of all conditions of Def. 2 
conclude the proof that StegBlocks allows for the creation of 
a network steganography method that is perfectly 
undetectable. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, a new concept for performing undetectable 
network steganography communication, called StegBlocks, 
was presented. StegBlocks is a framework for the creation 
of network steganography methods. It defines the way in 
  
 
which the methods work and at the same time allows for the 
creation of methods for various carriers (network protocols). 
Moreover, the paper contains the definition of perfectly 
undetectable network steganography. The definition is based 
on the definitions for general steganography developed by 
Cachin [7]. We adjusted this definition to cover the specific 
features of network steganography. 
Finally, the definition of perfect undetectability was 
used to show that it is possible to create a network 
steganography method based on StegBlocks which is 
perfectly undetectable (undetectable for the adversary with 
unlimited computational power). 
Although the ideas presented in this paper may seem to 
have limited practical applications, their objective is to show 
the possibility of a more thorough approach to the analysis 
of the undetectability of network steganography than is 
currently used in most publications. Most of the 
publications related to network steganography do not focus 
enough on undetectability. We hope that this article will 
spur more research regarding the undetectability of network 
steganography.  
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